Two Diametrically Opposed Jurists: The Jurisprudence of Chief Justices Roger B. Taney and Salmon P. Chase by Michalak, Alexandra M.
The Cardinal Edge 
Volume 1 Issue 1 Article 12 
2021 
Two Diametrically Opposed Jurists: The Jurisprudence of Chief 
Justices Roger B. Taney and Salmon P. Chase 
Alexandra M. Michalak 
University of Louisville, ammich04@louisville.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/tce 
 Part of the Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal Commons, and the United States 
History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michalak, Alexandra M. (2021) "Two Diametrically Opposed Jurists: The Jurisprudence of Chief Justices 
Roger B. Taney and Salmon P. Chase," The Cardinal Edge: Vol. 1 , Article 12. 
DOI: 10.18297/tce/vol1/iss1/12 
Available at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/tce/vol1/iss1/12 
This Full-length Research Report is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of 
Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Cardinal Edge by an authorized editor 
of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
thinkir@louisville.edu. 
Two Diametrically Opposed Jurists: The Jurisprudence of Chief Justices Roger B. 
Taney and Salmon P. Chase 
Cover Page Footnote 
Special thanks to Dr. Thomas C. Mackey from the University of Louisville History Department for his 
insightful input on my work. 





FULL LENGTH MANUSCRIPT 
Two Diametrically Opposed Jurists: The 
Jurisprudence of Chief Justices Roger B. Taney 
and Salmon P. Chase 
 
Alexandra Michalak1 
1 The University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA 
 
The role of the United States Supreme Court in the 
Antebellum and Civil War eras often fades into the 
background of history, overshadowed by the roles of both 
the executive and legislative branches of the United States 
through pre-war conflict, military strategy, and 
Reconstruction efforts.  Historian Herman Belz argued 
that in the Civil War era, “The issues that lay at the core 
of the controversy were political in nature and rightly 
belonged to the political branches to decide.  And with 
one major exception, the judicial branch generally 
respected this limitation.”1  The infamous exception Belz 
alluded to, Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), overshadows 
the impactful judicial history of the era, comprised of key 
cases such as Groves v. Slaughter (1841), Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania (1842), Jones v. Van Zandt (1847), 
Shortridge v. Macon (1867), Mississippi v. Johnson 
(1867), and Texas v. White (1869).  Although a valuable 
observation, the judicial branch played a larger role than 
Belz granted credit because of the efforts of two chief 
justices: Roger B. Taney and Salmon P. Chase.  Both men 
served as diametrically opposed jurists in terms of 
jurisprudence, legal strategy, and personal and political 
beliefs, yet both chiefs pushed the limits of the judicial 
branch to further their individual beliefs on slavery.  
Nonetheless, each chief justice left a distinct mark on 
Civil War, slavery, and Reconstruction case law by 
incorporating both legal and political arguments into their 
opinions through judicial activism. 
Chief Justice Taney and Chief Justice Chase sat at center 
seat at two antipodal time periods wedged apart by the 
Civil War: 1836 to 1864, and 1864 to 1873, respectively.  
Taney’s death and Chase’s appointment occurred amid 
critical points between 1863 and 1864.  Major turning 
points on the battlefield occurred, such as the battles of 
Gettysburg and Vicksburg, as well as the fall of Atlanta.  
The Emancipation Proclamation delivered by President 
Abraham Lincoln and the decisive election of 1864 
 
1 Herman Belz, “The Supreme Court and Constitutional 
Responsibility,” The Supreme Court and the Civil War 
(1996): 7.   
further determined the fate of the Union, shifting the 
debate surrounding slavery to amending the Constitution.  
This transition between chiefs serves as a backdrop to 
both jurists’ judicial methods, political beliefs, and case 
law legacy, as well as each jurists’ individual impact on 
political controversies.  Born thirty-one years apart, raised 
in contrasting geographical regions of the United States, 
and appointed by two vastly different presidents, both 
chiefs left a distinct, albeit significant mark on 
Antebellum and Civil War era legal history. 
TANEY’S EARLY LIFE: SOUTHERN LIFSETYLE, 
PROSLAVERY POLITICS, AND JACKSONIAN 
PRINCIPLES 
Descended from two lines of prominent families, Taney 
grew up a product of wealth and privilege on a southern 
tobacco plantation in Calvert County Maryland.  Born in 
1777, Taney lived surrounded by wealth generated 
through slavery his entire life, considering that his father, 
Michael Taney, “by the eve of the Revolution . . . was one 
of the wealthiest men in the country.”2  Significant 
quantities of slaves and land “created the wealth that sent 
Taney to college in Pennsylvania and supported him as he 
began his legal career,” and later maintained his wealth 
upon inheritance.  In fact, “in the course of his life, slaves 
served his family in households in Frederick, Baltimore, 
and Washington, D.C.  Eventually he . . . inherit[ed] more 
land and slaves from his father,” and gained even more 
when his wife brought some to the marriage in 1806.3 
Taney lived in a slave economy and society for his entire 
life, except for the three years he lived in the free state of 
Pennsylvania to attend Dickinson College at the age of 
fifteen.  After his stay in Pennsylvania, he never again 
lived with “people who were not southerners and slave 
owners,” residing in the “narrow cultural milieu of the 
slaveholding Chesapeake, living in Maryland and 
2 Paul Finkelman, Supreme Injustice: Slavery in the 
Nation’s Highest Court, 177-178.  
3 Ibid., 179. 





Washington, D.C.”4  Taney’s social environment and 
upbringing constructed his viewpoint on slavery, serving 
as the root of his staunch proslavery stance.  
Originally aligned with the Federalist Party, in 1799 
Taney won a seat in the Maryland House of Delegates.5  
He first disconnected from the Maryland Federalists 
through supporting the War of 1812, and by the time the 
Federalist Party had fully dissolved, Taney had shifted his 
support to the Jacksonian Democrats.6  As a result of his 
shifting political allegiances, in 1816 Taney won election 
to the Maryland state senate, where he served until 1821.  
Foundations of his political views on slavery began to 
emerge in this position, and historians and scholars have 
long debated Taney’s actions and motives in this period 
of his life.  In attempts to defend Taney and his beliefs, 
scholars often point to Taney’s support for legislation that 
prevented the kidnapping of freed slaves and the 
manumission of some of his own slaves.   
Indeed, in this period, Taney defended the free speech 
rights of Reverend Jacob Gruber, a white Methodist from 
Pennsylvania who condemned slavery in an 1818 speech.  
Taney defended Gruber against a charge of inciting slaves 
to revolt, portraying Taney as a protector of antislavery 
rhetoric.7  Although a welcomed victory for abolitionists, 
Taney’s action revealed little more than his dedication to 
his client, his skillful use of First Amendment protections, 
and Taney’s ability as a lawyer.  All these actions can be 
reduced to “charitable noblesse oblige” consistent with 
Taney’s “Federalist politics, and his moderate position as 
a slaveholder, colonizationist, and a supporter of the rule 
of law.”8   
Despite these antislavery performances, Gruber is the last 
time Taney said anything in public that was remotely 
hostile to slavery.9  Defenders of Taney often forget that 
he “quickly emerged as a politician who zealously 
protected slavery and was unalterably opposed to the 
rights of free blacks.”10  In addition, while in the Maryland 
senate, he also “supported a resolution to prevent 
Maryland slaves from escaping into Pennsylvania,” 
further protecting slave owners in Maryland.11  Even 
before Taney exercised his judicial power on the Supreme 
 
4 Ibid., 178. 
5 Earl M. Maltz, Dred Scott and the Politics of Slavery.  
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 77.   
6 David G. Savage, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 5th 
ed.  (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2010), 1090.   
7 Paul Finkelman, Supreme Injustice: Slavery in the 
Nation’s Highest Court, 180. 
8 Ibid., 180. 
9 Ibid., 181-182. 
10 Ibid., 182. 
Court to preserve slavery, Taney worked in his early life 
to maintain and promote slavery.   
In 1831 President Jackson appointed Taney as the United 
States Attorney General, and in 1832, Taney provided 
strong evidence of his view on slavery and African 
Americans in an unpublished opinion.12  Taney insisted 
that:  
The African race in the United States even when free, 
are every where a degraded class, and exercise no 
political influence.  The privileges they are allowed to 
enjoy, are accorded to them as a matter of kindness 
and benevolence rather than of right.  They are the 
only class of persons who can be held as mere 
property, as slaves.  And where they are nominally 
admitted by law to the privileges of citizenship, they 
have no effectual power to defend them, and are 
permitted to be citizens by the sufferance of the white 
population and hold whatever rights they enjoy at 
their mercy.  They were never regarded as a 
constituent portion of the sovereignty of any state.  
But as separate and degraded people to whom the 
sovereignty of each state might accord or withhold 
such privileges as they deemed proper.13 
He later argued a long-winded version of this statement in 
Dred Scott, establishing one of the most recognized yet 
most egregious opinions in Supreme Court history.  This 
particular statement demonstrated not only Taney’s 
position on slavery, but also that “he held these views a 
quarter of a century before Dred Scott.  Taney never 
published this opinion, and therefore it did not affect 
public debate.  But it certainly bolstered Jackson’s hands-
off policy toward Southern regulations of free blacks.”14  
Taney never retreated from these beliefs; he soon became 
a leading advocate for not only Jacksonian economic 
policies, but Jacksonian views on slavery.  Taney’s beliefs 
and actions prior to his chief justiceship differ from 
Chase’s pre-chief years in that Chase dedicated his life to 
preventing the spread and eliminating the existence of 
slavery, while Taney maintained and promoted his 
proslavery beliefs.   
Taney played a significant role as attorney general in the 
second Bank of the United States controversy, “helping to 
11 Ibid., 180. 
12 David G. Savage, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
5th ed., 1090-1091.   
13 Unpublished Opinion of Attorney General Taney as 
cited in Carl B. Swisher, Roger B. Taney.  (Hamden: 
Archon Books, 1961), 154.   
14 Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’: 
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,” 
Journal of Supreme Court History 1994 (1994): 90-91.   





write Jackson’s message in 1832 vetoing the bank’s 
recharter.”15  He even stepped in to preside over the new 
system of pet banks for nine months when Jackson 
dismissed his own Treasury Secretary, William Duane.  
However, Congress soon learned of Taney’s informal 
appointment and promptly rejected his nomination.  
Jackson had a better plan for Taney in mind, and 
appointed Taney to replace Associate Justice Gabriel 
Duvall.16  As a result of a close Senate vote to confirm 
Taney’s nomination, Congress postponed Taney’s 
nomination indefinitely; the postponement provided 
Jackson with an opportune moment.  Much “to the horror 
of the Whigs, who considered [Taney] much too radical,” 
Jackson appointed Taney to center seat upon Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s death in 1835.  The Senate confirmed 
Taney’s nomination on March 15, 1836, where Chief 
Justice Taney began his long twenty-eight years of service 
on the High Court.17  Taney’s ascendency to the chief 
justiceship not only represented the overbearing slave 
power of the South in all three branches of government 
but foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s role in upholding 
proslavery doctrine before the outbreak of the Civil War.   
A SLAVEHOLDER AND PROSLAVERY 
ADVOCATE AT CENTER SEAT 
Aside from Dred Scott, two other Supreme Court cases 
reveal Taney’s views on slavery, both Groves v. 
Slaughter and Prigg v. Pennsylvania.  In Groves, the 
Court examined a Mississippi state constitutional 
provision that banned the importation and sale of slaves 
and whether it violated the Commerce Clause found in 
Article I Section 8 of the United States Constitution.  The 
Court decided in favor of Slaughter, the individual who 
sold the slaves, explaining that the Mississippi state 
constitutional provision was not enacted at the time of the 
sale, therefore, rendering the contract valid and affording 
Slaughter the right to recover on promissory notes from 
the buyer.18   
As only one of the fourteen separate opinions Taney wrote 
throughout his tenure, his concurring opinion proved 
“Indicative of what would be his highly partisan approach 
to slavery throughout his career.”19  The Court did not 
reach the issue of the power of Congress to regulate the 
trafficking of slaves.  However, Taney himself admitted 
 
15 David G. Savage, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
5th ed., 1091.   
16 Ibid., 1091. 
17 Ibid., 1091.  
18 Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449 (1841).   
19 Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’: 
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,” 
91.   
that he would use this opportunity to address an issue that 
“is not involved in the case before us.  But as my brother 
[Justice] McLean has stated his opinion upon it, I am not 
willing, by remaining silent, to leave any doubt as to 
mine.”  In addressing this issue, Taney stepped outside of 
his judicial power granted to him, substituting a 
discussion of the controversy at hand for an argument 
supporting his own political beliefs.   
He continued on, explaining that the “power over this 
subject is exclusively with the several states, and each of 
them has a right to decide for itself whether it will or will 
not allow persons of this description to be brought within 
its limits, from another state, either for sale, or for any 
other purpose.”20  His opinion read as an admonition 
directed at northern politicians, insisting that the “federal 
government had no power over slavery,” despite the fact 
that neither petitioner nor respondent brought that issue to 
the Court.  This opinion held a clear proslavery stance, 
favoring states’ rights to regulate interstate slave trade.  
Taney safeguarded his position on this case by leaving no 
question as to what views he held; he clearly “did not want 
to leave any implication that under the Commerce Clause 
Congress might regulate slavery.”21  Although his 
concurring opinion held no binding power on the law, 
Taney’s proslavery sentiment expressed through his 
position on the Supreme Court further promoted the 
proslavery cause, and bolstered political proslavery 
arguments.   
Taney again demonstrated his explicit views on slavery 
only one year later in his opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part in Prigg.  Prigg proved to be a 
significant case for a variety of reasons, namely that it 
served as the “first fugitive slave case to arrive before the 
Supreme Court.”22  Taney strategically assigned the 
opinion of this case to Associate Justice Joseph Story; 
“likely he chose Story because it would be advantageous 
to have a northern justice issue an opinion that many 
contemporaries would consider proslavery . . . Likely, it 
had been clear at the time of the opinion’s assigning that 
all the justices agreed that Pennsylvania’s law should be 
struck down as unconstitutional.”23  The majority in Prigg 
examined a Pennsylvania law that prohibited the 
extradition of African Americans for the purposes of 
slavery under Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, as 
20 Concurring opinion of Chief Justice Taney, Groves v. 
Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449 (1841)..  
21 Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’: 
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,” 
91.   
22 Robert H. Baker, Prigg v. Pennsylvania: Slavery, the 
Supreme Court, and the Ambivalent Constitution.  
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 129. 
23 Ibid., 139. 





well as the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793.  Story, writing 
for the majority struck down the Pennsylvania law, 
upheld the federal fugitive slave law of 1793, and further 
declared that slaveowners had a Constitutional right to 
seize their slaves anywhere they found them.  His opinion 
served as a sweeping victory for slavery, “which shakes 
to the core his antislavery reputation.”24   
However, true to his nationalist beliefs, Story twisted his 
opinion to support what concerned him the most: 
“securing the high ground for congressional power to 
legislate.”25  Story explained that “The right to seize and 
retake fugitive slaves, and the duty to deliver them up, in 
whatever State of the Union they may be found is, under 
the Constitution recognized as an absolute positive right 
and duty pervading the whole Union with an equal and 
supreme force uncontrolled and uncontrollable by state 
sovereignty or state legislation.”  Story continued, 
securing his nationalist view in his argument by 
illustrating that the fugitive slave clause created  
A new and positive right . . . The natural inference 
deducible from this consideration certainly is . . . that 
it belongs to the legislative department of the national 
government . . . It would be a strange anomaly, and 
forced construction, to suppose that the national 
government meant to rely for the due fulfillment of its 
own proper duties and rights which it intended to 
secure, upon state legislation; and not upon that of the 
Union.26 
Story injected his own political viewpoint into the case, 
and considering Story’s nationalist analysis, it is evident 
that “Taney would come to regret assigning Story to the 
opinion.”27 
In another one of his separate opinions, Taney disagreed, 
arguing that the states possess the power to pass laws that 
aided the return of fugitive slaves.  Taney ignored his own 
previous departure from the question presented to the 
Court in Groves, criticizing Story, claiming that he does 
not “consider this question [of exclusivity] as necessarily 
involved in the case before us.”28  This dismissal of his 
own actions in favor of slavery revealed Taney’s 
dedication to preserving slavery from the bench.  Taney’s 
opinion once again held no binding power over the law, 
but only contributed to the proslavery movement and to 
 
24 Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’: 
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,” 
92.   
25 Robert H. Baker, Prigg v. Pennsylvania: Slavery, the 
Supreme Court, and the Ambivalent Constitution, 141.   
26 Justice Story’s majority opinion in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).  
27 Robert H. Baker, Prigg v. Pennsylvania: Slavery, the 
Supreme Court, and the Ambivalent Constitution, 139.   
the culmination of judicial discourse that led to the Dred 
Scott decision.    
Clearly protecting southern states’ interests and 
reinforcing the compact theory of the Union, Taney 
argued that the words in the law “seem evidently designed 
to impose it as a duty upon the people of several states to 
pass laws to carry into execution, in good faith, the 
compact into which they solemnly entered with each 
other.”  He then asked, “why must not a state protect a 
right of property, acknowledged by its own paramount 
law?”  Taney then drew a comparison between slaves and 
other forms of property, demonstrating that “the laws of 
different states, in all other cases, constantly protect the 
citizens of other states in their rights of property, when it 
is found within their respective termitories [sic]; and no 
one doubts their power to do so.”29  In addition to his 
dismissal of his own departure from the constitutional 
question in Groves, Taney’s slavery jurisprudence served 
as a contradiction in and of itself.  Prigg demonstrated that 
“When it came to slavery, Taney supported state power 
for the southern states, while rejecting the right of the free 
states to protect the rights of free African-Americans.”30  
These logical discrepancies and Taney’s tendency to pick 
and choose when to apply certain constitutional 
provisions when it came to slavery demonstrated Taney’s 
explicit interest in preserving slavery through law and the 
judiciary.   
Overall, although a victory for the South, Prigg served as 
a landmark case in the general scheme of Antebellum case 
law.  The Taney Court’s decision in Prigg resulted in far-
reaching consequences; “it convinced many abolitionists 
that the Constitution was the problem, not the solution, to 
slavery.”31  In stark contrast to Chase’s political and 
constitutional strategy at the height of his career, the 
Taney Court suggested a bleak future for abolitionists and 
antislavery politicians alike.  In 1842 when the Court 
handed down Prigg, both groups could not have imagined 
nor predicted the impending devastation of Dred Scott. 
Compared to his previous jurisprudence on race and 
slavery, in the 1850s, Taney unleashed his most violent 
views of slavery and “abandoned all pretense of neutrality 
in sectional issues.  ‘Behind his mask of judicial propriety, 
the Chief Justice had become privately a bitter 
28 Justice Taney’s separate opinion in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).   
29 Justice Taney’s separate opinion in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
30 Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’: 
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,” 
92.   
31 Robert H. Baker, Prigg v. Pennsylvania: Slavery, the 
Supreme Court, and the Ambivalent Constitution, 7.   





sectionalist, seething with anger at Northern insult and 
Northern aggression.’”32  Assigning the majority opinion 
to himself, Taney used Dred Scott to his advantage; he 
seized this moment to perform, in his opinion, service to 
the public by resolving an intense constitutional issue that 
was dividing the nation.33  At this point in the national 
debate over slavery and in his career, Taney understood 
that he served as “in some ways, the Confederacy’s 
greatest ally in Washington.”34  Compared to the other 
“lilliputian nonentities” leading the nation at the time such 
as President Franklin Pierce and President James 
Buchanan, “Chief Justice Taney seemed to be the only 
leader in any branch of government,” and Taney 
recognized that himself.35   
Tension between northerners and southerners on Capitol 
Hill proved ever growing in the late 1850s, providing 
Taney with an ideal setting.  Except for Associate Justice 
Robert Grier, “all of the other justices took the 
opportunity to express separate opinions” on at least some 
of the issues in the case, yet Taney did not stand alone on 
his Court.  In the end, “seven justices concluded that the 
Scotts remained slaves, while two believed that Dred 
Scott and the other members of his family were legally 
entitled to their freedom.”36   
Taney began his opinion by settling the issue of 
jurisdiction, turning to the question of citizenship.37  
Harkening back to his 1832 unpublished opinion as 
attorney general, Taney reasoned that “because free 
blacks lacked fundamental rights at the time the 
Constitution was adopted, they were not considered 
citizens at that time,” and further concluded that the 
“descendants of slaves could not become citizens of the 
United States,” and, therefore, could not possess standing 
to sue in federal court.38  As a result, Taney concluded that 
the Court did not hold proper jurisdiction. 
At this point in his argument, Taney could have ended his 
opinion from a purely legal perspective.39  The beginning 
of the opinion proved a great victory for the South and 
proslavery supporters.  However, Taney again abandoned 
 
32 Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’: 
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,” 
87.   
33 James F. Simon, “Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney,” 
Journal of Supreme Court History 35 (2010): 231-233. 
34 Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’: 
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,” 
98.   
35 Ibid., 85.   
36 Earl M. Maltz, Dred Scott and the Politics of Slavery, 
118.   
37 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).   
the central legal question presented, addressing the issue 
of race, the place of African Americans in United States 
society, and other issues pertaining to slavery in the new 
territories.  His opinion struck down the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820, categorized slaves as property 
under the Fifth Amendment, and decided that any law 
depriving a slave owner of that property violated the 
Constitution.40   
Of course, Taney’s constitutional argument in Dred Scott 
appeared unpersuasive and reaching, but aside from the 
case’s obvious disgrace, other lasting implications 
emanate from the case: “[Taney] did not practice judicial 
self-restraint, he was the first Chief Justice to persuade the 
Court to invalidate a major national policy enacted by 
Congress, and he was the first jurist to appreciate the full 
potential of the Supreme Court as a legislative body.”41  
Although a controversial decision in the context of the 
1857 Court and the Court of today, Taney, “At one stroke 
. . . significantly enlarged the scope of judicial power by 
finding a standard in the Constitution of substantive 
fairness.”42  The defining case of Taney’s career provided 
not only a irreparable harm to the United States, to 
African Americans, and to the Supreme Court, but altered 
the Supreme Court’s power and its legacy. 
Other scholars and historians have argued that Dred Scott 
served as an unusual mistake for Taney, referring to his 
opinion as an aberration that diverged from his usual 
jurisprudence.  Although Dred Scott served as the greatest 
mistake of Taney’s career and perhaps of the entire 
history of the Supreme Court, scholars must not “reduc[e] 
his slavery jurisprudence to just one case” and then 
dismiss the case as a single mistake.  By doing so, 
“scholars misunder[stand] the depth of Taney’s support 
for slavery and his hostility to African-American 
rights.”43  Taney’s views on slavery proved well 
developed before he sat on the High Court, and well 
before he wrote his infamous decision.  As a result, “far 
from aberration, Dred Scott can,” and should, “be seen as 
the culmination of Taney’s ideas on race and slavery.”44  
Taney’s early life and career, as well as the line of cases 
38 Earl M. Maltz, Dred Scott and the Politics of Slavery, 
119-120.   
39 Ibid., 120.   
40 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).   
41 Great Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court: Ratings and 
Case Studies.  Edited by William D. Pederson and 
Norman W. Provizer.  (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, Inc., 1994), 75. 
42 Ibid., 85.   
43 Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’: 
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,” 
86.   
44 Ibid., 90.   





from Groves and Prigg, demonstrate that Taney pursued 
the measured goal of reinforcing proslavery case law 
throughout his tenure; in Taney’s mind, Dred Scott served 
as the ultimate achievement of that goal, one that 
decelerated and opposed the life work of Chief Justice 
Chase.  
CHASE’S EARLY LIFE: FROM “ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF FUGITIVE SLAVES” TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL ABOLISTIONIST 
Born into the free state of New Hampshire on January 13, 
1808, Chase came from a prominent family dating back 
to the 1640s in the United States.  At age twelve, Chase 
traveled to live with his uncle, a Protestant Episcopal 
Bishop.  His devotion to his Episcopalian faith became 
instilled in him while living with his uncle, further 
inspiring Chase’s antislavery views.  He graduated from 
Dartmouth College in 1826, and then studied law under 
Attorney General William Wirt.  After passing the bar in 
1829, Chase moved west to practice law in Cincinnati, 
Ohio.45    
In time, Chase became known as the “attorney general for 
fugitive slaves.”  He joined the antislavery movement 
early, recognizing the tremendous power slaveholders 
gained from fugitive slave laws, and dedicated his early 
career to defending runaway slaves.46  In 1837 Chase 
defended a runaway slave named Matilda; the argument 
he used in this case later became one of his most notorious 
defenses of fugitive slaves.  Chase challenged the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, crafting a multifaceted 
argument that claimed that the Act granted no 
enforcement power to Congress.47   
In the end, Chase failed to convince the local judge, who 
remanded Matilda back to the slave catchers.  Although 
Chase’s efforts fell short at the local level, Chase’s 
argument “in the Matilda case was published as a 
pamphlet and distributed widely throughout the country 
 
45 David G. Savage, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
5th ed., 1104.   
46 Michael E. Woods, “‘Tell Us Something About State 
Rights:’ Northern Republicans, States’ Rights, and the 
Coming of the Civil War,” Journal of the Civil War Era 
7 (2017): 248.   
47 Randy E. Barnett, “From Antislavery Lawyer to Chief 
Justice: The Remarkable but Forgotten Career of Salmon 
P. Chase,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 63 
(2013): 661.   
48 Ibid., 662.   
49 Salmon P. Chase, “An Argument for the Defendant, 
submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States, at 
the December Term, 1846, in the case of Jones v. Van 
Zandt,” as cited in Randy E. Barnett, “From Antislavery 
where it elevated his visibility and provided the legal basis 
for other challenges to the constitutionality of the Fugitive 
Slave Act.”48  The pamphlet, titled Speech of Salmon P. 
Chase, in the Case of the Colored Woman, Matilda, 
brought Chase’s argument to the national level, serving as 
a valuable step forward in the antislavery movement 
while amplifying Chase’s antislavery ideas.  
Chase built on this argument and used the Matilda case to 
develop a stronger claim for another fugitive slave case 
presented to the Supreme Court in Jones v. Van Zandt.  In 
addition to the structural objection of the Fugitive Slave 
Act, Chase added a Fifth Amendment due process 
argument, contending that “Now, unless it can be shewn 
[sic] that no process of law at all, is the same thing as due 
process of law, it must be admitted that the act which 
authorizes seizures without process, is repugnant to the 
constitution.”49  Chase bolstered his argument through 
referencing the intention of the framers, “appealing to 
what he called the ‘plain import’ of the text.”50   
Unfortunately, the Taney Court dismissed Van Zandt on 
the pleadings, and Chase never appeared to argue before 
the Court because of a rule Taney implemented that 
“denied oral argument on matters that had already been 
adjudicated.”51  However, as in Matilda, Chase’s 
constitutional arguments in Van Zandt gained national 
attention through a published pamphlet, even appearing in 
the Western Law Journal.52  The impact of Van Zandt and 
Chase’s argument better served the antislavery cause than 
the Taney Court’s decision on the issue, which upheld the 
Fugitive Slave Law as constitutional.53 
After Chase’s fugitive slave arguments gained national 
attention, Chase used his constitutional arguments to 
begin his political career in the 1840s.  In 1840 he helped 
form the Liberty Party and became a leading member.54  
In 1848, however, Chase stepped away from the Liberty 
Party and helped form the Free Soil Party.  The party’s 
platform adopted Chase’s contention that the “founders 
Lawyer to Chief Justice: The Remarkable but Forgotten 
Career of Salmon P. Chase,” 663.   
50 Randy E. Barnett, “From Antislavery Lawyer to Chief 
Justice: The Remarkable but Forgotten Career of Salmon 
P. Chase,” 665.   
51 Ibid., 667.   
52 Salmon P. Chase, “March 3, 1847,” in The Salmon P. 
Chase Papers: Volume I Journals, 1829-1872, ed. John 
Niven (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1993), 
186. 
53 Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. 215 (1847).   
54 Randy E. Barnett, “From Antislavery Lawyer to Chief 
Justice: The Remarkable but Forgotten Career of Salmon 
P. Chase,” 668.   





had intended to make slavery a local institution, and that 
the federal government was barred by the Fifth 
Amendment from creating the condition of bondage 
anywhere in its jurisdiction.”55  He served as a United 
States Senator from the Free Soil Party from 1849 to 
1855, until he left the Senate to serve as the Governor of 
Ohio from 1855 to 1859.56  Chase officially aligned with 
the Republican Party when he left the Senate, playing a 
major role in the party’s establishment.  As in the Free 
Soil platform, the Republicans supported Chase’s claim 
that Congress lacked the authority to recognize or create 
slavery anywhere in its jurisdiction, and adopted this 
argument in its 1856 and 1860 platforms.57   
The constitutional arguments Chase made in Matilda and 
Van Zandt served as only the beginning of Chase’s 
antislavery political career; he and other Republicans 
employed these arguments to convince “thousands of 
northerners that anti-slavery was the intended policy of 
the founders of the nation.”58  Chase established the 
rallying cry of “freedom national” for the Senate 
Republicans, declaring in the Senate: “‘Freedom is 
national; slavery only is local and sectional’”59  In terms 
of Chase’s legacy, his “constitutional abolitionism” 
proved his most valuable political contribution to the 
antislavery movement.60  As opposed to Taney, who used 
his early political career to promote the continuation of 
slavery through proslavery laws and sentiment, Chase 
developed, promoted, and spread the concept of 
constitutional abolitionism, a unique approach to the 
tumultuous political debate surrounding slavery.   
Although his arguments proved politically persuasive, 
“no federal court adopted Chase’s constitutional 
interpretation in the ante-bellum years.”61  However, 
Chase’s legal and “constitutional arguments are 
remarkably persuasive compared to those advanced by 
the Supreme Court in cases such as Dred Scott.”62  In 
addition, his arguments strengthened the power of the 
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Republican Party, and “help[ed] explain why Lincoln’s 
victory in 1860 provoked the Southern states to secede.”63  
While firm in his beliefs and goals, Chase can be 
characterized as a radical who twisted anti-slavery 
arguments into widely popular political charges, which 
necessarily required concession in order to rally 
widespread political support.  Chase’s argument for 
constitutionality served as essential and better defined the 
parameters of anti-slavery for northerners and those in the 
Republican Party who wavered between opinions on 
slavery.  Chase’s creative interpretation of the 
Constitution and his talent as a legal mind caught the 
attention of President Lincoln, who appointed Chase to 
his cabinet as Secretary of the Treasury in 1861.64 
Lincoln and Chase often disagreed, and Chase’s cabinet 
position intensified their conflict.  Disagreements ranged 
from economic issues to war resources, but slavery and 
Reconstruction served as the most contested issue 
between the two.  In fact, Chase “allowed himself to 
become the focus of an anti-Lincoln group within the 
Republican Party.”65  Chase privately criticized Lincoln 
for being so dilatory on slavery, and later railed against 
Lincoln’s pocket veto of the Wade-Davis bill.66  Chase 
went as far as accusing “Lincoln and his advisors . . . of a 
Reconstruction plan that would leave slavery in place.”67  
Chase admitted in his journal on July 6, 1864 that Senator 
Samuel C. Pomeroy, “cannot support Lincoln, but wont 
[sic] desert his principles,” then confessed that “I [share] 
much of the same sentiments; though not willing now to 
decide what duty may demand next fall.”68 
Disagreements between the two and other political 
ambitions pushed Chase to resign from the cabinet only 
seven days after that journal entry in July of 1864, where 
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he writes “today I leave Washington a private citizen.”69  
Throughout his career, Chase would never quite suppress 
his fierce desire for the presidency.  Chase attempted to 
gain the Republican nomination for president as early as 
1856, and for every presidential election thereafter.  
Despite failure to attain his most sought-after position, 
Chase signaled interest in a judicial post to round out his 
career.  Often after experiencing frustration with his 
political ambitions, “he yearned for what he supposed was 
the relative peace and quiet of the Supreme Court.”  He 
reasoned that a judicial post “could also be a useful base 
for his presidential ambitions,” still refusing to retire his 
dream.70 
Regardless of his political aspirations, Chase’s 
accomplishments proved best achieved through legal 
strategy and reasoning.  Lincoln recognized Chase’s adept 
legal mind despite the discord between the two, and upon 
Chase’s resignation from the cabinet, Lincoln accepted 
the resignation with relief.  Lincoln reassured irritated 
Chase supporters at the time of Chase’s resignation that 
“‘if I have the opportunity, I will make him Chief Justice 
of the United States.’”71  Lincoln and the “Republicans 
knew that the courts would be crucial in establishing a 
new, free, constitutional order once the war was over . . . 
Chase was not only one of the preeminent Republican 
political leaders, but he had been among the leading legal 
and constitutional spokesmen of the antislavery 
movement.”72  The Civil War itself proved to be an 
unprecedented event; Lincoln and Congress realized early 
on that Reconstruction would serve as an even more 
strenuous legal feat.   
Volumes of legislation flowed from both the legislative 
and executive branches, enhancing the “role of the federal 
judiciary, and the Supreme Court's role in defining what 
[this legislation] meant.”73  In December of 1864, the 
Supreme Court underwent a revolutionary shift.  The 
Supreme Court that had previously consisted of 
southerners and southern sympathizers during the 
Antebellum and Civil War years welcomed new 
leadership in 1864; the proslavery, slave owning author of 
Dred Scott was succeeded as Chief Justice by the attorney 
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general for fugitive slaves, marking a radical shift in the 
judicial branch’s case law on slavery.  
AN ANTISLAVERY CHAMPION AS CHIEF 
JUSTICE: THE CHASE COURT’S 
RECONSTRUCTION CASE LAW 
By the time Taney died and Chase took center seat, the 
Court composed of an “essentially new complement of 
Justices.  Of those who had sat more than a few years with 
Chief Justice Roger Taney, only Samuel Nelson and 
Robert Grier were to remain for a significant time.”  
Lincoln appointed four new justices during his presidency 
in addition to Chase, including Noah H. Swayne, Samuel 
F. Miller, David Davis, and Stephen J. Field.74  The Chase 
Court signified a new era of the role of the Court, 
considering in the Reconstruction years alone “the Chase 
court struck down eight federal statutes” and “35 state 
laws as unconstitutionally restrictive of the rights of 
blacks,” compared to the two federal statutes struck down 
in the entire history of the Supreme Court.  Through the 
lens of his constitutional abolitionist outlook, Chase did 
not hesitate to strike down laws in violation of the 
Constitution that proved antithetical to the antislavery 
cause.  Even following Lincoln’s death and the 
uncertainty of Reconstruction, “Chase steadfastly assured 
the Radical Republicans in Congress a free hand to 
continue with the Reconstruction programs in the South 
without judicial review or interference.”75 
Justices still practiced circuit riding at the time of Chase’s 
tenure, and the Judiciary Act of 1866 readjusted the 
circuit boundaries.  Mindful of the disproportionate power 
granted to the southern states through circuit boundaries 
and of the “expanding territorial reach of the American 
continent and the growing amount of litigation,” Congress 
rearranged five of the nine circuits that consisted of slave 
states alone.76  Chase presided over Taney’s old circuit 
that encompassed Maryland, North Carolina, and 
Virginia.  Perhaps out of a desire to enforce and uphold 
Reconstruction efforts at a local level, “Chase found 
circuit court duties more to his taste.  For there he was 
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very much his own man and most of his decisions had 
immediate, direct impact.”77   
Chase addressed secession and rebellion in Shortridge v. 
Macon.  Macon, the defendant, claimed that the existence 
of the Confederacy and certain laws passed under that 
government confiscated a debt owed to the plaintiff.  The 
Court, however, affirmed the continuity of federal 
sovereignty over the Confederacy during the war.  As a 
result, federal sovereignty maintained the right of 
northern creditors to collect debts from the South incurred 
prior to secession and war.78 
Chase addressed the issue at hand with ease, deciding that 
“War, therefore, levied against the United States by 
citizens of the Republic, under the pretended authority of 
the new state government of North Carolina, or of the so-
called Confederate government which assumed the title of 
the ‘Confederate States,’ was treason against the United 
States.”  Relying on international law principles 
throughout his decision, Chase argued that “on no 
occasion, however, and by no act, have the United States 
ever renounced their constitutional jurisdiction over the 
whole territory . . . or conceded to citizens in arms against 
their country the character of alien enemies, or admitted 
the existence of any government de facto, hostile to itself 
within the boundaries of the Union.”   
Chase then administered a warning, explaining that 
“Those who engage in rebellion must consider the 
consequences.  If they succeed, rebellion becomes 
revolution . . . if they fail, all their acts hostile to the 
rightful government are violations of law, and originate 
no rights which can be recognized by the courts.”79  In the 
end, Chase concluded that “Legal rights could neither be 
originated nor defeated by the action of the central 
authorities of the late rebellion,” and therefore, Macon 
must fulfill payment of his debt.  Overall, Chase decided 
that secession did not serve as a valid defense to treason.80  
In a letter to Horace Greeley in June of 1867, Chase 
explained his reasoning in Shortridge:  
I saw no ground on which the rebel acts of 
sequestration could be set aside, if the de facto 
character of the rebel government were admitted; for 
it is the universal rule that the acts of a defacto 
government done during its existence as such, are 
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valid.  And there is no middle ground between a 
defacto government, and a treasonable combination 
of rebels in arms, every exercise of whose pretended 
authority against the government is treason.81 
Harkening back to his days in the Senate and cabinet, 
Chase relied on the outcome of the war, reinforcing the 
Republican ideal that the Confederacy had to pay for the 
consequences of its actions through Reconstruction.   
Outside of the Fourth Circuit, the Chase Court decided 
Mississippi v. Johnson (1867) and Texas v. White (1869), 
two significant Reconstruction era cases.  Decided only 
two months before Shortridge, the Court in Johnson 
“unanimously held it had ‘no jurisdiction of a bill to 
enjoin the President in the performance of his official 
duties.’”82  Relying heavily on Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s argument in Marbury v. Madison (1803), 
Chase outlined a distinction between the ministerial and 
discretionary responsibilities of the president.  Chase 
defined a ministerial duty as “a simple, definite duty, 
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and 
imposed by law.”  In contrast, Chase explained that the 
duty brought by the Reconstruction Acts to President 
Andrew Johnson “is in no just sense ministerial.  It is 
purely executive and political,” and it would be, in the 
words of Marshall, “an absurd and excessive 
extravagance” if the Court could weigh in on the 
performance of the executive branch.   
Through making a separation of powers argument, Chase 
concluded that “neither [branch] can be restrained in its 
action by the judicial department; though the acts of both, 
when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its 
cognizance.”83  Through this decision, Chase preserved 
the right of the president to enforce the first and second 
Reconstruction Acts, although alleged to be 
unconstitutional by several southern states.  The Chase 
Court received political support from Republicans in 
Congress upon hearing the decision in this case; Chase 
documented this support in a letter to Associate Justice 
David Davis, recounting that “Almost all were glad that 
we decided the Mississippi and Georgia cases, and 
decided them as we did.”84 
Chase “finally succeeded in writing most of the Radical 
philosophy of Reconstruction into the Constitution” in the 
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most significant Reconstruction case brought to the 
Supreme Court, Texas v. White.85  He secured and 
established the permanency of the Union, further 
enshrining the idea that “Union victory had rested on a 
firm legal foundation.”86  The Court addressed the 
questions of whether Texas possessed the right to bring 
suit and whether Texas could constitutionally reclaim 
Confederate bonds.87   
Chase began his majority opinion by addressing the major 
threshold problem: “the Supreme Court had jurisdiction 
only if the suit was between ‘a State and Citizens of 
another State,’ and Texas had purported to secede from 
the Union.  Thus, the Chief Justice found it necessary to 
hold that secession was unconstitutional.”88  Reusing the 
secession argument from Lincoln’s first inaugural, Chase 
disposed of the secession argument in only a paragraph:  
The Union of the States never was a purely artificial 
and arbitrary relation.  It began among the Colonies, 
and grew out of a common origin, mutual sympathies, 
kindred principles, similar interests, and geographical 
relations.  It was confirmed and strengthened by the 
necessities of war, and received definite form, and 
character, and sanction from the Articles of 
Confederation.  By these the Union was solemnly 
declared to “be perpetual.”  And when these Articles 
were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the 
country, the Constitution was ordained to “form a 
more perfect Union.”  It is difficult to convey the idea 
of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these 
words.  What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, 
made more perfect, is not? 
He concluded that the “Constitution, in all its provisions, 
looks to an indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible States.”  Since Texas joined the Union 
under the presumption that it joined an indissoluble 
relationship, the secession of Texas, and of all the other 
states which seceded, violated the Constitution.  Texas 
retained its status as a state of the Union; therefore, Texas 
possessed the right to bring suit.  
Chase addressed the second question by arguing that the 
law passed in 1862 by the rebellious Texas government 
that repealed an 1851 law requiring endorsement of the 
governor to issue state bonds did not serve as a valid law; 
therefore, the rebellious Texas government “cannot be 
regarded in the courts of the United States, as a lawful 
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legislature, or its acts as lawful acts.”89  As a result, the 
Court rendered the act repealing the 1851 law null and 
void, deeming the Confederate bonds worthless.  It is true 
that Chase and the majority engaged in a one-sided 
contradiction, where the Court “accepted without 
supporting argument the standard Radical view of . . . 
secession: the Southern states had annihilated their rights 
but not their obligations.”90  Nonetheless, the Court 
deemed the rebellious Texas government as invalid, all 
while maintaining that Texas remained a state throughout 
the conflict. 
A DIRECT COMPARISON OF TANEY AND 
CHASE 
In terms of career milestones, Taney and Chase lived 
similar lives.  Although Chase’s true dedication and 
ambition rested in politics, both jurists started out as 
young attorneys, served in some legislative capacity, and 
served in the executive branch.  The length of Taney’s 
tenure more than doubles Chase’s time on the Court, 
providing Taney with more time to enshrine his 
proslavery sentiment in Antebellum case law.  Both men 
served in a political setting for a similar length of time; 
Chase however, used his time more effectively, 
promoting his antislavery beliefs through significant 
political action and legislation.  As with many people 
from this period, the most fundamental belief separating 
Taney and Chase proved in step with the nation in the 
Civil War era: Taney’s proslavery sentiment and Chase’s 
antislavery commitment.    
Evident in each of their early lives, Chase’s genuine 
antislavery actions further separate Taney and Chase.  
Compared to Taney, Chase supported his expressed 
beliefs on fugitive slaves in court through his antislavery 
actions, applying his beliefs to real political advocacy.  
Chase served the interests of his client as Taney did, 
except Chase’s beliefs on slavery never faltered 
throughout his career, and certainly never changed to 
support the opposing side.  Stemming from his deep 
religious and moral views, Chase dedicated his entire 
career to the antislavery cause, shaping the Constitution 
into an antislavery document to persuade his colleagues.  
His sympathy in the antislavery cause proved genuine; 
Chase recounted in his journal reading Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin and weeping, as well as the horror story of a 
fugitive slave named Rosetta who Chase represented, and 
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the sorrow he felt toward her and the abuses she 
endured.91  Chase made his true beliefs regarding slavery 
available rather than hiding behind his duties as a lawyer.   
Later in life, Taney did the same as attorney general, 
revealing his vehement support for slavery.  Just as 
Chase’s inspiration for his beliefs surrounding slavery 
stemmed from his religious devotion, Taney’s 
slaveholding status, regional bias, and dedication to a 
slave society inspired his proslavery beliefs.  Evidenced 
by Taney’s passionate judicial opinions throughout his 
chief justiceship, Taney held proslavery views from the 
beginning until the end of his life, a product of his heritage 
and predisposition to slavery as a slave owner.   
CONCLUSION 
Despite opposing views, both jurists used the cases 
brought to the Court to advance their own agendas 
regarding slavery.  Although Taney tended to stray away 
from the question presented to the Court to a greater 
extent than Chase, both jurists practiced judicial activism 
in attempting to write political arguments into the law.  
For Taney, the most obvious example of this practice is in 
Dred Scott, where Taney believed he settled the question 
of slavery once and for all.  Chase’s judicial activism 
proved more subtle in his opinions; he artfully intertwined 
legal reasoning with his political agenda as he practiced 
all throughout his career.  However, through private 
correspondence, blatant Republican ideals, and legal 
opinions, Chase promoted his antislavery agenda from the 
bench.  Although the executive and legislative branches 
settled much of the debate surrounding slavery through 
legislation, war, and constitutional amendments, the 
judicial branch, through Chief Justices Taney and Chase, 
pushed, pulled, and altered the discussion of slavery, 
further inspiring the other two branches on both sides of 
the controversy.  Both jurists left a distinct mark on Civil 
War era case law, shaping the role of the Supreme Court 
in Civil War and Reconstruction history and its judicial 
review functions for decades to come. 
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